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I. BY WAY OF A PROLOGUE
Lockean property rights theory1 establishes that a creation belongs naturally
to its creator. There is little disagreement that property and property rights are
born simultaneously. Information is an intangible property and is produced
through the labour of intellect. Again, invoking Locke,2 this information should
then be private property of the labourer.3 But information is a non-excludable
and non-rival good.4 Hence, a (legal) framework to grant (a) exclusive right for
(b) a limited period helps sequentially5 balance (a) incentive (for labourer) to
produce the information, and (b) access (for society) to make use of the
information. This framework is intellectual property.
So as to favour accessibility of intellectual property thus created, society
needs a transaction system whereby the benefits of creation (legally said,
property right) can be shared amongst all those who value it. This system is
naturally based on some sort of market transactions. The buyer of the right
pays some money for it. The seller of the right takes that money as
compensation for having made a socially beneficial creation. Where demand
meets the supply, price is determined. We achieve an equilibrium.
However, this may be a difficult equilibrium to achieve because of the
inherent non-rival and non-excludable nature of the information good6–once
the intellectual property has been divulged to another person it becomes a
public good.7 Such characteristics allow free-riders to take access without
1. JOHN LOCKE, TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION
19–21 (Charles L. Sherman ed. 1937) (1690).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and Allocation of Resources for Inventions, in THE
RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS, 609 (National
Bureau of Economic Research ed. 1962) (for illustration of this problem).
5. The sequence is as follows: initially, with exclusive rights, the information becomes
excludable. Thereafter, when work passes into public domain, it becomes free for the consumers.
6. Information good/service is any commodity/service whose value is determined by the
information it contains. The nature of material does not matter, but only arrangement of material
matters. Common examples are CD, computer file, book, invention formula, and so on. See JAMES
BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE AND SPLEENS: LAW AND CONSTRUCTION OF INFORMATION SOCIETY
(1996).
7. A public good in economics is considered to be non-rival, meaning goods/services where
increasing consumption of that good/service does not reduces its availability to other users; and also
non-excludable, which are those goods where it may be impossible to prevent people who have not
paid for that good/service. Imagine national defense, or air in the environment. These are public goods.
See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Knowledge as a Global Public Good, in GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS 308, 308 (Inge
Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg & Marc A. Stern eds., 1999) (for theoretical treatment of knowledge as public
good); FRANÇOIS LÉVÊQUE & YANN MÉNIÈRE, THE ECONOMICS OF PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS 7–9
(2004) (for an excellent understanding of non-rivalry and non-excludability in intellectual property
rights).

RAMANUJAM GOYAL FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

376

MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV.

6/23/2014 1:41 PM

[Vol. 18:2

paying.8 Therefore, society needs an artificial mechanism that excludes nonpayers, lest the market generates insufficient revenues to compensate the
creator for his efforts and dilute his incentives to create that property in the first
place. This artificial mechanism is provided by an exclusionary right, called
IPR. So while IPR accords temporary monopoly power on the right holder, it
results in a deadweight loss in the form of excluding buyers for who the good
has become unaffordable.9 The upside is, IPR framework incentivizes people
to innovate and it also propels diffusion on knowledge, thereby helping
development of cumulative innovations. Designing an optimal IPR framework
therefore demands a compromise between the costs and benefits at both public
and private realms.
As the normative and structural strands of legal theory suggest, IP laws are
fundamentally located in the skeleton of property rule. However, given the
public good nature of the information product, temporary monopoly imposes
huge public costs. Take for example, pharmaceutical innovation. A life-saving
drug, when granted a patent, will be sold at a cost unaffordable to a large chunk
of population thereby increasing social costs. For such externality that
germinates in intellectual property laws, incorporation of liability rules has
emerged as a reactionary solution. In this paper, we will attempt to show that
proponents of liability rules carry a heavy theoretical burden that needs to be
spelt out.10
The paper is an attempt to excavate silences of property-liability framework
in a cacophony of compulsory licensing. The remainder of the paper is divided
as follows. In Part I, we illustrate the legal framework of compulsory licensing
as a mechanism by way of which the right holder of the intellectual property
(IP) will have to license the use of her/his rights to another party, at the behest
of the government. Part II explores the relationship between compulsory
licensing and property-liability framework. We highlight here, that compulsory
licensing is a liability-based approach, and its imposition on a foundational

8. See Arrow, supra note 4; TOM D. CROUCH, THE BISHOPS BOYS: A LIFE OF WILBUR AND
ORVILLE WRIGHT (for a classic example. In this biography, the author described the Wright brothers’
dilemma when, prior to filing for a patent on their airplane design, they were approached by the
government to reveal their invention; they proposed a large up-front payment to solve the problem);
see also William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J.
LEGAL STUD. 325 (1989); Stanley M. Besen & Leo J. Raskind, An Introduction to Law and Economics
of Intellectual Property, 5 J. OF ECON. PERSPS. 3 (1991).
9. A deadweight loss is reduction in transactions by throwing out those buyers who now find it
unaffordable to pay. Landes & Posner, supra note 8.
10. Roberto Mazzoleni & Richard R. Nelson, The Benefits and Costs of Strong Patent
Protection: A Contribution to the Current Debate 27 RES. POL’Y 273 (1998) (the paper shows that the
conventional astuteness amongst economists, lawyers, and many public officials is heavily weighted
towards the proposition that “patent rights are conducive to economic progress”).
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property rights based approach on which IP laws are based, needs to attract
academic principles that guide this approach. We expect to surface the
institutional, conceptual, and theoretical feasibility inherent in the marriage of
property and liability based approach for compulsory licensing, through
building an analytical narrative. In Part III, IPR regimes of India and Canada
are compared with a focus on patents for medicines. In the case of Canada, we
look at the institution of compulsory licensing from the view of the Doha
Declaration,11 by way of which relevant clauses that favour implementation of
compulsory licensing provisions were incorporated into the text of Trade
Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).12 The case of India is however,
hinged on the regular flexibility in TRIPS, as incorporated in the Indian Patents
Act 2005. Conclusion follows in Part IV.
II. COMPULSORY LICENSING: CONCEPT AND SHORT HISTORY
The term “compulsory license” is often used as an umbrella term for many
types of non-voluntary authorizations by the State (or any of the State’s
machinery) to exercise a patentee’s rights without his or her authorisation, such
as ex officio licenses, government use, crown (or government) use, licenses to
remedy anti-competitive practices, mandatory licenses, and statutory licenses.13
Compulsory licenses can be given for any kind of intellectual property, and it
can take various names. In general, compulsory licensing is used to address
anti-competitive issues of IPR.14 The extensive survey taken by World
Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) between 2009-11 exposed a wide
variety of usages of the term compulsory licensing,15 which included invoking
on account of national or public interest; public health; compulsory cross-

11. World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2002) (The basic idea was to carve out flexibilities in TRIPS
particularly for circumventing patent rights for ensuring that access to essential medicines is not
adversely affected in (mainly) developing regions of the world. Paragraphs 6 of Doha Declaration
states: “We recognize that WTO Members with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the
pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties in making effective use of compulsory licensing under
the TRIPS Agreement. We instruct the Council for TRIPS to find an expeditious solution to this
problem and to report to the General Council before the end of 2002.” This paragraph was implemented
in amending the TRIPS Agreement by the Ministerial Declaration taken on 30 August 2003).
12. Other Use Without Authorization of the Right Holder art. 31, Jun. 1, 1995, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 300, 313 (Article
31 of TRIPS is a result of Doha Declaration) [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement].
13. Coenraad Visser, Patent Exceptions and Limitations in the Health Context, at 10, U.N. Doc.
SCP/15/3 (Sep. 2, 2010).
14. WIPO Secretariat, Survey on Compulsory Licenses Granted by WIPO Member States to
Address Anti-Competitive Uses of Intellectual Property Rights, U.N. Doc. CDIP/4/4
REV./STUDY/INF/5 [hereinafter Survey on Compulsory Licenses].
15. Id.
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licensing; failure to work; non-exploitation of IP rights for a period of time;
patent-dependency; necessity to supply markets; exporting patented drugs;
inter alia.16 The concept can also take various nomenclatures. For example, in
the European Union (and also in the United States), in the case of a single
dominant company, the concept is called the ‘essential facilities doctrine.’ An
essential facilities doctrine specifies when the owner(s) of an essential or
bottleneck facility is mandated to provide access to that facility at a reasonable
price.17 The term essential facilities doctrine originated in commentary on
United States antitrust case law and now has multiple meanings, each having
to do with mandating access to something by those who do not otherwise get
access.18 Over time however, the doctrine is more closely associated with anti
trust cases, and its application in IP is rather rare.19 Compulsory licensing is
fairly important and frequent however, in copyright statutes. For example, the
Copyright Act of 1909 and 1976 in USA, both have compulsory licensing
provisions.20
But in no other domain has compulsory licensing been more debated,
contextualized and argued over, as in the case of pharmaceutical patents.
Health improvements stimulate economic development21 and so does
innovation. If there is a trade-off between the two, it is a difficult choice.
Compulsory licensing seems to tip the needle in favour of health, and therefore,
has been the source of unending controversies, socio-political maneuvering by
interest groups, and schism between industry and civil society. On one hand,
industry supporters argue that doling out compulsory licenses reduces
incentives to innovate, while on the other, civil society and public health
advocates vociferously narrate the perils associated with giving monopoly
rights on life saving drugs. Our paper deals with the subject of compulsory
licensing, solely on the application of compulsory licenses on pharmaceutical
patents.
It may be worthwhile to have a quick glance at how the global political
machinery developed the framework of compulsory licensing.22 Compulsory
16. Id. at 7–8.
17. OECD, Policy Roundtables The Essential Facilities Concept (1996), http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd\34/20/1920021.pdf.
18. Id. at 7.
19. Survey on Compulsory Licenses, supra note 16.
20. See Robert Stephen Lee, An Economic Analysis of Compulsory Licensing in Copyright Law,
5 W. NEW ENG. L. R. 203, 204 (1982).
21. David E. Bloom & David Canning, The Health and Wealth of Nations, 287 SCIENCE 1207,
1209 (2000).
22. See JEROME H. REICHMAN & CATHERINE HASENZAHL, NON-VOLUNTARY LICENSING OF
PATENTED INVENTIONS: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, LEGAL FRAMEWORK UNDER TRIPS, AND AN
OVERVIEW OF THE PRACTICE IN CANADA AND THE USA ISSUE PAPER NO. 5 13 (2003) at
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Licensing has been an integral part of the patent regime since its inception and
at least one hundred countries make compulsory licenses available in one form
or another.23 The introduction of patents in Venice in the fifteenth century was
accompanied by a broad set of rules, which included the state’s right to issue a
compulsory license.24 Article 5A(2) of the Paris Convention of 1883 also
provides for the liability rule.25 And ever since 1883, this tool has become a
fixture in patent systems around the world, and has perpetually been a topic of
controversy.26 Even during the World Wars, compulsory licensing was resorted
to for the sharing of aviation technology and the manufacture of penicillin.27
It may be important to briefly dwell on emergence of compulsory licensing
in the international framework as it stands today. With the decline of American
manufacturing and growth of technology-led firms, the United States began
raising the public perception of the importance of IPR.28 The result was the
linking of IP with trade and seeking global protection.29 This attracted a lot of
resistance, particularly by developing countries like India.30 However, with the
intense political maneuvering and bargaining power that America had over
trade with India and other countries, coupled with pressure groups of
pharmaceutical companies, developing nations succumbed. A comprehensive
agreement was tabled and negotiated at the end of the Uruguay Round of the
http://ictsd.net/downloads/2008/06/cs_reichman_hasenzahl.pdf.
23. Carlos M. Correa, Intellectual Property Rights and the Use of Compulsory Licenses:
Options for Developing Countries, 4, 24 (Ctr. for Advanced Studies at the Univ. of Buenos Aires, Arg.,
Working Paper 1999).
24. CHRISTOPHER MAY & SUSAN K. SELL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: A CRITICAL
HISTORY 58–59 (2006).
25. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, England–France–
Sweden–United States, art. 5, available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/trtdocs_
wo020.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2014) (“Each country of the Union shall have the right to take
legislative measures providing for the grant of compulsory licenses to prevent the abuses which might
result from the exercise of the exclusive rights conferred by the patent, for example, failure to work.”)
[hereinafter Paris Convention].
26. Colleen Chien, Cheap Drugs at What Price to Innovation: Does the Compulsory Licensing
of Pharmaceuticals Hurt Innovation?, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 853, 859 (2003).
27. DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY & PROMOTION, DISCUSSION PAPER ON
COMPULSORY LICENSING (2011) available at http://thebigredbiotechblog.typepad.com/files/dipp-cldraftdiscussion1.doc.
28. Peter M. Gerhart, Reflections: Beyond Compliance Theory–TRIPS as a Substantive Issue,
32 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 357, 367 (2000).
29. It is well illustrated how senior management of Pfizer was responsible for creating this link,
by bringing together various other interested corporations and making IP privileges the most important
priority of the United States in the 1980s. See JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL
BUSINESS REGULATION 61–62 (2000).
30. Elizabeth Chien-Hale, Asserting U.S. Intellectual Property Rights in China: Expansion of
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction?, 44 J. COPR. SOC’Y 198, 226; see also ROBERT C. BIRD, Defending
Intellectual Property Rights in the BRIC Economies, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 317, 328–29 (2006).
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General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1994, called Agreement on Trade
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights31 (TRIPS). Essentially,
countries embracing TRIPS were required to fulfill greater IP protection, with
the patent period fixed at twenty years, and in return got access to foreign
markets and a safety net from whims of unilateral sanctions from their
governments.32 TRIPS was a revolution in the world of intellectual property
with pharmaceutical companies emerging as major winners.33 To be a member
of WTO, countries had to sign TRIPS (although their signing was deferred until
later, by when they were thought to develop sufficient expertise to be able to
withstand competitive forces from the industrialized world).34
What the developing countries achieved through the TRIPS negotiations
was the tool of compulsory licensing expressed in Article 31.35 In short,
referring to “use without the authorization of the right holder,” article 31
explicitly permits member states to issue compulsory licenses under three
circumstances: (1) after efforts to obtain a license from the patent holder on
“reasonable commercial terms and conditions” have failed, (2) in the case of
“national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency” and (3) for
public non-commercial use. Although the usage of this tool came with certain
preconditions, they were waived off in cases of national emergency.36 One of
the conditions however, was to employ the use of compulsory licensing
predominantly for domestic markets,37 and many of the concerned markets had
no ability or capacity to manufacture the generic version of the patented drug
in question. This constraint was removed through the Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, now known as Doha Round, where developing nations firmly
resolved to participate only if their demands were met. Finally, Ministerial

31. See Marrakesh Agreement, Annex 1C, supra note 12 at 311–15; Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154.
32. See Marrakesh Agreement, Annex 2, supra note 12 at art. 418.
33. Jerome H. Reichman, Compulsory Licensing of Patented Pharmaceutical Inventions:
Evaluating the Options, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 247, 247 (2009).
34. Countries like India, China, Brazil were given time until 2005, while other countries,
particularly the LDCs were offered a delay of few more years (patents until 2013 and pharmaceutical
patents until 2016). See Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Extension
of the Transition Period Under Article 66.1 for Least-Developed Country Members, IP/C/40 (Nov. 30,
2005); Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Extension of the Transition
Period under Article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement for Least-Developed Country Members for Certain
Obligations with Respect to Pharmaceutical Products, IP/C/25 (July 1, 2002).
35. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, supra
note 12; JAYASHREE WATAL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WTO AND DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 24 (2002) (Noting that Indian delegation was instrumental in getting the article
incorporated).
36. Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 12.
37. Id.
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Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health of 2001 affirmed that
TRIPS can be interpreted to promote access to medicines for all38 and later
expressly declared the legitimacy for importing the drug from countries that are
willing to do so.39 This waiver is also called the Decision of 30 August 2003.40
III. PROPERTY RULES, LIABILITY RULES AND THEIR COEXISTENCE IN IPR:
ONE VIEW OF THE MODEL
In the four sub-sections that follow, we propose to argue that countries
having weak property rights framework will (and should) attract liability
regimes and those that are characterized by strong property rights framework
do not need to invoke liability structures. In other words, compulsory licensing
is justified if IP regimes of countries are weak and not when they are strong.
The sections methodically show how: (a) choice of property or liability rests on
transaction costs, (b) licensing mode (compulsory or voluntary) depends on
transaction costs, (c) low transaction costs favour strong IPR regimes and high
costs prefer weak IPR frameworks. In the last sub-section we link these
findings to show that compulsory licensing regimes will be successful in weak
IPR regimes.
A. Transaction Costs as Determinant of Choice of Legal Rule
The dichotomy between property rules and liability rules was set in the most
illustrative manner in Calabresi-Melamed’s seminal paper (hereinafter referred
to as Cathedral Paper) published in 1972.41 This was an interesting and
convincing analytical tool stimulating scholars in various disciplines–most
notably in law and economics–to cross-navigate beyond established
terminology to appreciate functional and formal differences/congruence
between two different areas of law–property and liability.42 The property38. See World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,
¶4, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2001).
39. Id. at ¶6.
40. This waiver however, has only been used once by Canada in exporting the drug to Rwanda,
owing to procedural inefficiencies. See Paige E. Goodwin, Right Idea, Wrong Result–Canada’s Access
to Medicines Regime, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 567 (2008); note that the following countries agreed not to
use the Paragraph 6 provisions as importing members: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States of
America. Id.
41. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and
Inalienability: One View of a Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
42. It was because of this article, along with his other seminal work in tort law that he is
considered to be a founder of law and economics movement, along with Ronald Coase and Richard
Posner. Under his influence (he was the Dean of Yale Law School) Yale Law School became one of
the leading centre for economics influenced legal scholarship.
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liability rule framework has inspired a range of scholarship in issues related to
legal protection of information goods43, and has been extremely useful in
understanding copyright collectives44, determining appropriate protection of
incentives to innovate45 and explaining relationship between several IP
regimes.46
Cathedral Paper puts forth what are property rules and how do they differ
from liability regime:
An entitlement is protected by a property rule to the extent that someone
who wishes to remove the entitlement from its holder must buy it from
him in a voluntary transaction in which the value of the entitlement is
agreed upon by the seller. It is the form of entitlement which gives rise
to the least amount of state intervention: once the original entitlement
is decided upon, the state does not try to decide its value. It lets each of
the parties say how much the entitlement is worth to him, and gives the
seller a veto if the buyer does not offer enough. . . . Whenever someone
may destroy the initial entitlement if he is willing to pay an objectively
determined value for it, an entitlement is protected by a liability rule. . . .
Obviously, liability rules involve an additional stage of state
intervention: not only are entitlements protected, but their transfer or
destruction is allowed on the basis of a value determined by some organ
of the state rather than by the parties themselves.47
Hence, a property rule is a legal entitlement that can be bought only after
bargaining with the entitlement holder and the price for the transaction is
mutually decided by the buyer (holder) and seller of the right. On the other
hand, under a liability rule, a tribunal (third party) will determine the
appropriate compensation in an ex post proceeding. Cathedral Paper’s
argument establishes that transaction cost48 is the primary determinant of the
43. See Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, An Economic Analysis of Damage Rules in
Intellectual Property Law, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1585, 1693 (demonstrating how Cathedral Paper
should be decided for baseline recovery in cases of IP infringement–plaintiff’s damages or defendant’s
profits accrued from infringement); see also Dan L. Burk, The Trouble with Trespass, 4 J. SMALL &
EMERGING BUS. L. 27 (2000) (for a critical argument utilizing Cathedral paper in favour of injunctive
relief in internet context); Alex Kozinsky & Christopher Newman, What’s so Fair about Fair Use?,
46 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 513 (1999) (in the context of copyright law).
44. Robert P. Merges, Contracting Into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and
Collective Rights Organization, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1293
45. Mark Schankerman & Suzanne Scotchmer, Damages and Injunctions in Protecting
Intellectual Property, 32 J. INDUS. ECON. 199, 202 (2001).
46. J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94 COLUM.
L. REV. 2558 (1994).
47. Calabresi, supra note 41 at 1092 (footnote omitted)
48. Simply put, transaction costs in terms of law and economics are those costs that are incurred
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choice for property rule or liability rule. Whenever market transaction costs are
low, property rules are preferred; while liability rules are favoured when the
transaction costs are high.49 The argument for such factorization is simple.
Whether parties can negotiate for the transaction of the right is a direct function
of how costly the bargaining process is. In other words, transaction costs will
determine whether price discovery will be a result of negotiation or whether a
third party will impose prices it has determined on the basis of (so-called)
objective criteria. The doctrine asserts that low transaction costs favour
negotiation and reaching a Coasian bargain,50 while high transaction costs will
impede any Coasian solution to be achieved.51 Therefore in the case of high
transaction costs, parties will not be able to come to a mutually agreeable
solution, and will need a tribunal (third party) which can declare the damage
quantum and ensure the same. This is a crucial starting point for hinging our
discussion against.
Low market transaction costs facilitate negotiation and adjustments, so
there is no need of a third party to enforce a bargain. The parties themselves
can contract mutually. However, when institutional design of voluntary
negotiation is ineffective due to high transaction costs, liability rule (third party
enforcement) suits best. Remember that employing property rule is possible
only when transaction costs are low. This in turn means that (a) parties to a
transaction are easily identifiable to each other, (b) costs of transaction between
the parties is low, “and ([c]) a court setting the terms of the exchange would
have a difficult time doing so quickly and cheaply, given the specialized nature
of the assets and the varied and complex business environments in which the
assets are deployed.”52 Hence parties make their own deal. This approach
generally builds the argument that property rules are better suited to protect IP
as opposed to liability rules in case of low transaction cost. Liability rules
always come with an efficiency loss and their application in presence of low
in making an economic exchange. These may include search and information costs, bargaining costs,
enforcement costs, contracting costs, negotiation costs. Transaction cost economics has led to a series
of development in law and economics scholarship. See R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4
ECONOMICA 386 (1937) (for first theoretical reference); see also Oliver E. Williamson, The Economics
of Organisation: The Transaction Cost Approach, 87 AM. J. SOC. 548 (1981).
49. Calabresi, supra note 41.
50. Coase in his seminal article suggested that if initial entitlements are clear, they don’t matter
in absence of transaction costs. Efficient solution will always be reached no matter who has the
entitlement. This is famously called Coase Theorem. He proposed that if transaction costs are
negligible, parties can effectively negotiate and contract to buy the right. Whoever values it more will
get it, and that in fact is efficient solution. See R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON.
1 (1960) [hereinafter Coase, Social Cost].
51. Calabresi, supra note 41 at 1106-8.
52. Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The Case of
Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75, 78 (1994).
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transaction costs does not make sense since the objective can be achieved at a
lesser cost. One can imagine such efficiency losses in costs imposed by
incomplete information of the third party, inefficient fixation of price,
diminished utility of the parties, procedural delays and constraints,
administrative expenses, flaws in institutional design, generation of perverse
incentives, possibilities of errors, political economy factors, psychological
costs or perhaps, the transaction not taking place at all (which happens to be the
case many a times). On the other hand, in presence of high transaction costs,
liability rules are employed to avoid the danger of adopting a suboptimal
solution, a result that flows naturally if we modify the Coase theorem and view
it from a non-zero transaction cost perspective.53 The costs of incorporating
liability rule in a property rule set-up is offset by the exercise of the transaction
which should yield a higher optimal outcome.
The Cathedral Paper therefore states, among other things, that the choice of
property or liability rule depends on transaction costs. Property rules are
achieved in low transaction costs, while liability rules are used when transaction
costs are high. This can further be explained to understand that property rule
is applied when negotiation is possible because transactions costs are lower,
whereas liability rule is applied when negotiation is not possible in the face of
high transaction costs.
B. Licensing
Licensing activity refers to the grant of creator’s rights (IP right) to noncreator at a price called licensing fee. Low market transaction cost facilitates
negotiated licensing transaction between the right holder and the one who is
seeking the license for using and sharing the right holder’s invention (if it is a
patent, say). When market transaction costs are low, it lets the parties negotiate
and reach a mutually amicable price for the license. On the other hand, if the
market is faced with a high transaction cost, it is difficult to bargain the license.
Therefore, in those circumstances, government/a court acts as a third party and
intervenes through ‘non-voluntary’ contract between the creator and the noncreator. The crucial assumption–which we are not disputing–is that for public
interest, it is indeed important that the license be given. In the absence of a
third party, and in presence of high transaction costs, the license will never be
doled out, which is not the desirable solution. The solution comes in the form
of an involuntary contract enforced by a third party. This intervention comes
in the form of compulsory licensing (for the purpose of this article, in patents).
The government authorizes itself to allow third parties to use the subject matter
of a patent without the authorization of the right holder or a mandated
53. See Coase, Social Cost, supra note 50.
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authorization of the right holder. In these cases, the public interest in broader
access to the invention is considered more important than the private interest of
the right holder to fully exploit his exclusive rights.54
Compulsory licensing for pharmaceutical products aims at ensuring that
everyone has an access to essential medicines at affordable prices. While
recognizing a nation’s right to protect the public health of its people, even at
the expense of not honoring intellectual property rights, TRIPS was flexibilized
through incorporation of clauses concerning compulsory licensing, and nations
securing their desire to amend their national laws to conform to the flexible
TRIPS in the manner it suits best to the nations. In addition, the InterMinisterial Conference of the World Trade Organization initiated the Doha
Agenda. The objective of granting compulsory licenses is to prevent the abuse
of monopoly granted by the patent, and to safeguard the public welfare and
health care issues prevailing in the nations. In the present context, the exercise
is sought to obtain permission to manufacture the generic versions of the
patented drug. Compulsory license is generally made “available for
manufacture and export of patented pharmaceutical products to any country
having insufficient or no manufacturing capacity in the pharmaceutical sector
for the concerned product to address public health problems.”55
It is notable that the very logic behind providing the flexibility is to fulfill
the normative frameworks of public health, at the cost of rights-based
framework. Compulsory licensing therefore portrays liability framework
because the rights holders are protected by a “liability rule” (royalty set by the
government) instead of a “property rule” (receipt of an injunction with the
rights-holder then negotiating the price out with potential buyers).56 Hence,
while compulsory licensing stands as a true liability rule, property rule is
invoked whenever licenses are given on voluntary licensing. Whether property
rule (voluntary licensing) or liability rule (involuntary licensing) should be
preferred is a discussion we will come back to a little later. With little reason,
it stands clear that voluntary licensing will take place if the transaction costs
are low, while compulsory licensing will be preferred in high transaction costs
(negotiation for licensing without involving a third party is easy if bargaining
costs are low, while for higher bargaining costs, negotiations will fail or not
take place at all–a clear case for third party intervention).
The above discussion demonstrates that voluntary licensing is possible at

54. REICHMANN & HASENZAHL, supra note 22.
55. Swarup Kumar, Compulsory Licensing under Trips: A Study of Roche v. Natco Case in
India vis-à-vis the Applicability of the Principle of Audi Alteram Partem, 7 SCRIPTED 135, 149 (2010)
available at http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/script-ed/vol7-1/kumar.asp.
56. Calabresi, supra note 41.
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low transaction costs, whereas high transaction costs disfavour voluntary
licensing. This also means that compulsory licensing emerges in the
foreground when transaction costs in the picture are higher.
C. Licensing and IPR Strength
Trade in licensing is a natural consequence. A license is a commercial
contract between licensor and licensee. Primarily, it specifies two basic
features–the subject material which has an intellectual property and functional
use of the subject material. The licensee compensates the licensor for use of
licensed subject by a flat fee (lump-sum) and/or through royalties based on
income earned by the licensee. The royalty rate can be fixed at a varying
percentage of licensee’s value of output, units of output, profits, or sales.57
Licensees save the expense of independent research and development for the
licensee and licensors derive fees and royalties, as well as capitalize on
licensees’ local reputation and knowledge. There are a number of other
advantages of licensing for both the parties, thereby achieving Pareto optimal58
solutions:
a) Some companies may not have sufficient investment capacity to
operationalise Foreign Direct Investment and penetrate the market
on their own. These small companies therefore can then use licenses
to test a market before making huge investments.
b) Licensing creates an easy entry and exit from the pharmaceutical
market, which is otherwise characterized by high fixed costs and
therefore rigid and few exit options.59
c) Licensors can earn fixed revenue much quicker from the license and
therefore get an early return on their research and development
(R&D) efforts.60
Our contention is that when costs of enforcing contracts (transaction costs)
57. See ALAN S. GUTTERMAN, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC
ALLIANCES: A SURVEY FOR CORPORATE MANAGEMENT (1995); see also Bharat N. Anand and Tarun
Khanna, The Structure of Licensing Contracts, 48 J. INDUS. ECON. 103, 130 (2000).
58. Pareto Optimality is due to Vilfredo Pareto, an Italian economist whose thesis had that
optimality is achieved when there is at least one person better off with no one worse off. See VILFREDO
PARETO, COURS D’ECONOMIE POLITIQUE (vol. II 1897); JULES L. COLEMAN, MARKETS, MORALS
AND THE LAW 67–132 (1988) (for discussion about Pareto efficiency in detail).
59. Author believes that FDI may be very costly exercise. Also export sales may face tariff and
non-tariff barriers.
60. This is an important point. It was raised at the High-Level Workshop on IPR and Economic
Development in China: Meeting Challenges and Opportunities Following WTO Entry, Beijing, April
2004, organised by OECD in collaboration with State IP Office and Development Research Centre of
State Council, China.
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are low, this may be because of strong IPR regimes. Strong IPR regimes can
be characterized by clearly defined rights and identifiable boundaries, rights
holder-favouring regime, emphasis on innovation and incentives structure,
strong enforcement mechanisms, and certainty. And interestingly, certainty
reduces market transaction costs. The certainty of entitlement of the right
reduces costs associated with identification, information, and bargaining. In
addition, certainty also crystallizes the boundaries of patents. It creates strong
enforcement mechanisms, thereby making infringement impossible and
licensing the only alternative for access to technology. Thus stronger IPRs will
facilitate expanded licensing regimes and may confer excess market power
thereby lifting up license fee and discouraging prospective licensees. However,
if the license fee is worth the investment, it will result in license being issued,
and if it is not, then compelled by market forces (under our assumption of low
market transaction costs), the license fee will reduce. Either ways, an efficient
solution will be achieved. On the other hand, if the IPR regime is weak, the
right holder may still want to license his right to a local producer to have the
latter safeguard him against possible infringement.
There have been several studies taking different approaches that have
gotten more or less similar results. In 1984, Farok Contractor attempted to
correlate patent protection and licensing using cross-sectional data, which
explained the determinants of the ratio of receipts in the United States of
royalties and licensing fees from unaffiliated sources to various measures of
direct investment activity.61 The study defined patent intensity of a nation by
flows of new patents in force. Technology transfer on the other hand was used
as proxy for licensing. The study found that patent intensity indeed did attract
licensing. The argument behind this observation is that patent protection
increases the income extractable from licensing. In another well-cited study,
Edwin Mansfield established62 that multinationals are less likely to engage in
technology transfer (licensing) with firms of countries where IP protection is
weak.63 In yet another study, Pamela Smith infers64 that the effect of stronger
IPRs on international licensing depends on the imitative capabilities of host
countries, by drawing on cross-sectional data on US multinationals’ licensing
61. Farok J. Contractor, Choosing Between Direct Investment and Licensing: Theoretical
Considerations and Empirical Tests, 15 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 167 (1984).
62. Edwin Mansfield, Intellectual Property Protection, Foreign Direct Investment, and
Technology Transfer, INT’L FIN. CORP. Discussion Paper No. 19, (1994).
63. However, this finding depends on the industry or nature of the technology. U.S. firms in the
chemicals and electronics industries appeared to place a greater emphasis on intellectual property
protection, whereas firms in the metals and transportation industries were seen to be less reliant on it.
See id.
64. Pamela Smith, How Do Foreign Patent Rights Affect U.S. Exports, Affiliate Sales, and
Licenses?, 48 J. INT’L ECON. 151 (2001).
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activities in 50 countries.65
Later studies extended the scope and methodology of the general finding,
that strong patent rights and licensing activities are positively correlated. Yang
and Maskus extended the analysis of US foreign licensing to a panel data set
covering three time periods (1985, 1990, and 1995) and twenty-three partner
countries, of which approximately ten are developing or emerging market
economies. They found that countries with stronger patent rights attract larger
volumes of licensed technology.66 More recently, Michael Nicholson finds that
R&D intensive firms are more apt to license when patent protection is strong.67
His approach is to focus on count data rather than value data. It was a crosssectional empirical analysis and it pools together data for 1995 from forty-nine
destination countries and eighty-two industries.
While previous studies were using Bureau of Economic Analysis
aggregated industry or national level data, Branstetter, Fisman, and Foley
conducted a study using Bureau of Economic Analysis micro-data. A key
finding was that IPR reforms–signifying strength of patent protection–stimulate
US firms to license abroad to affiliated parties.68
Anand and Khanna attempted to explore how much licensing is dependent
on IPR protection levels. The study employed data on international licensing
contracts from the Joint Ventures and Strategic Alliances database of the
Securities Data Company.69 The authors found that licensing in the
pharmaceutical and chemical sectors is dependent on patent protection, while
licensing in the semiconductor industry is relatively less dependent on it. In
their hypothesis, the authors suggested that this could be due to the fact that
contents and boundaries of knowledge are relatively easy to ascertain for
products in pharmaceutical and chemical industry, but for products in semiconductors (circuit-layout etc.), knowledge boundaries are blurred so patent
protection cannot be substantial enough to encourage licensing.
Another study, one that has empirically arrived at conflicting result, is that
of Andrea Fosfuri in 2003.70 It established weak effects of IPRs on
65. In situations where imitative risk is low, stronger IPRs serve primarily to raise rents to rights
holders. In countries where imitative capabilities are high, stronger patent rights stimulate licensing to
unaffiliated foreign firms. See Besen & Raskind, supra note 8.
66. Guifang Yang & Keith E. Maskus, Intellectual Property Rights and Licensing: An
Econometric Investigation, 137 WELTWIRTSCHAFTLICHES ARCHIV 58 (2001).
67. Michael Nicholson (2003) “The Impact of Industry Characteristics on International
Technology Transfer”, Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission Working Paper.
68. Lee G. Branstetter, Raymond Fisman & C. Fritz Foley, Do Stronger Intellectual Property
Rights Increase International Technology Transfer?, (Columbia Business School Working Paper No.
20, 2002).
69. Anand & Khanna, supra note 57, at 105.
70. Andrea Fosfuri, Country Risk and the International Flows of Technology: Evidence from
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international licensing and found that patent rights have an insignificant or
negative effect on licensing. It used firm-level data for the world chemical
industry. However, this study was focusing only on firms with process
innovations. And for such innovations, patents may not be the most effective
mechanism. In fact, it has been noted that biotechnology–a standard process
innovation–firms prefer trade secrecy to patent protection.71 Process
innovations are harder to enforce compared to product innovations. In other
words, as explained in the next section, process patents are equivalent to weak
IP protection, and a move from process to product patents is a move towards
stronger IP protection. Hence, this finding does not in any way undermine the
results found in other papers.
One study, conducted by OECD, deserves our special attention because of
its elaborate methodology and effective control variables.72 This study
undertakes a regression analysis to estimate the relationship between indicators
for licensing and IPR strength in developing countries, while controlling for
other factors. This study attempts to make an empirical contribution to one of
the main channels of technology transfer–licensing. It considered the
relationship between strengthening of IPR and licensing activities, particularly
in the 1990s. It employed a regression analysis to draw on an international data
set to consider the relationship over time between changes in the host-country
patent regime and changes in the number of licensing transactions between
developed and developing countries. The strength of IPR was measured by
different IP index, like patent rights,73 copyrights74 and trademarks,75 and
finally the fourth index examines enforcement effectiveness.76
This study is conducted first using aggregate data, then the firm-level data.
the Chemical Industry (July 2003) (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Working Paper).
71. Nikolaus Thumm, Research and Patenting in Biotechnology: A Survey in Switzerland,
SWISS FEDERAL INSTITUTE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, https://www.ige.ch/fileadmin/user_upload/
Juristische_Infos/e/j10005e.pdf 1 (2003), https://www.ige.ch/fileadmin/user_upload/Juristische_
Infos/e/j10005e.pdf.
72. Walter G. Park & Douglas Lippoldt, The Impact of Trade Related Intellectual Property
Rights on trade and Foreign Direct Investment in Developing Countries, 3 ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV. PAPERS (SPECIAL ISSUE ON TRADE POLICY) Paper No. 294 (2003).
73. Juan C. Ginarte & Walter G. Park, Determinants of Patent Rights: A Cross National Study,
26 RES. POL’Y 283; Walter G. Park & Smita Wagh, Index of Patent Rights, in ECONOMIC FREEDOM
OF THE WORLD ANNUAL REPORT 2002 (James Gwartney et al. eds., 2002).
74. Taylor William Reynolds, Quantifying the Evolution of Copyright and Trademark Law
(2004) (Doctoral dissertation paper).
75. Id.
76. See Office of the United States Trade Representative, http://www.ustr.gov/Document_
Library/Reports_Publications/Section_Index.html (last visited 20 Oct. 2010) (No formal study has
been done to measure enforcement effectiveness, but some information collected by Park and Lippoldt
comes from reports filed with US Trade Representatives.)
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Variables that needed controlling were, gross productivity, corruption, tariff
rates, and country risks for example. The study finds general support for the
proposition that strengthening of IPRs has a net positive effect on technology
transfer via licensing. This result is perhaps synchronous with our first
prediction that strong IPRs (effective enforcement and certainty in bargaining)
make it attractive for right holders to appropriate the returns to innovation by
increasing the licensing efforts. It is interesting to note that licensing fees and
royalties were found to vary positively with stronger patent rights and more
effective enforcement.77 A country can stimulate innovation more effectively
only with a given strengthening of patent rights. This is because patents
generate deadweight loss in the country that affords protection and accordingly
provides for dynamic efficiency. Scholars have constructed an index of patent
rights and have shown that the index is highly correlated with per capita GDP,
accordingly Global North (producers of innovation) typically provide stronger
patent protection than their counterparts in the Global South (consumers of
innovation).78
It was also indicated in the statistical study that a critical level of patent
protection is needed before firms have an incentive to engage in licensing. This
is the reason, perhaps, as to why developing nations even after their ‘reforms,’
do not attract voluntary negotiations for licensing and have to resort to the
compulsory nature of licensing. The study also showed, surprisingly, that with
weak IPRs, firms may be compelled to undertake FDIs and not licensing, for
obvious reasons.79 But as soon as the IPRs become strong, licensing is chosen
over FDIs.80
Intuitively, it is not difficult to understand why licensing thrives in strong
IP regimes.81 If IP rights are not strong, prospective licensees will have
sufficient incentives to imitate and use the product without paying any license.
This theoretical thread binds all empirical studies too.
This sub-section explains that voluntary licensing is prominent and
effective in strong IPR regimes and compulsory licensing in weak IPR regimes.

77. Copyrights and trademarks rights were found to exercise comparatively weak influences.
This may be due to a number of factors, which don’t merit our attention here, except that there needs
to be due appreciation of diverse nature of these intellectual properties and therefore one must
understand that they deserve to be treated differently. See Landes & Posner, supra note 8.
78. Ginarte & Park, supra note 73.
79. Ignatius Horstmann & James R. Markusen, Licensing Versus Direct Investment: A Model
of Internalization by the Multinational Enterprise, 20 Can. J. Econ. 464, 471–74 (1987). See also Yang
& Maskus (2001), supra note 66.
80. Id.
81. See Nancy T. Gallini, Patent Policy and Costly Imitation, 23 RAND J. ECON. 52 (1984)
(for elaborate theoretical discussion).
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D. Connecting the Dots
The three strands of discussion above can be connected analytically. We
attempt to do this here. As discussed, whether liability or property rule be
applied, is the outcome of the level at which transaction costs exist. Property
rules are achieved in low transaction costs, while liability rules are used when
transaction costs are high. Furthermore, voluntary licenses’ negotiations arrive
at successful conclusions when transaction costs are low and compulsory
licenses are invoked when transaction costs are high. Therefore, when
transaction costs are low, IPR regimes are property rule based, and are therefore
strong. On the other hand, liability regimes develop in IPR regimes, which are
weak in nature. Hence, it makes sense to install the framework of compulsory
licensing in jurisdictions that are characterized by weak IPR regimes. This is
the pivotal result that we arrive at for the purpose of our analysis. Analytically:
SINCE,
Property rules ≈ low transaction costs
Liability rules ≈ high transaction costs
AND
Low transaction costs ≈ negotiation ≈ voluntary licensing
High transaction costs ≈ no negotiation ≈ compulsory licensing
THEREFORE,
Property rules ≈ voluntary licensing
Liability rules ≈ compulsory licensing
IV. IPR REGIMES OF CANADA AND INDIA
The choice of comparative analysis of Canada with India stems from a
shared priority that the countries have in their policies of access to medicines
and their relative locations with respect to access to medicines and public health
concerns. Both countries have had their own tryst with implementing
flexibilities in TRIPS (Canada employing the para. 6 decision of Doha
Declaration and India invoking the domestic regulation clause for compulsory
licensing), while located in different income group countries.
In 2005 India shifted to implement the new Patent Act, with strong clauses
in favour of inventors (for example, product patents replacing earlier process
patents), and also implemented TRIPS with its flexibilities. India has
positioned itself as one of the global leaders in manufacturing of generic
medicines. India today, has assumed a pivotal responsibility of being regarded
as what Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) calls, Pharmacy of the Developing
World.82 85% of the HIV/AIDS patients that MSF treats in over thirty countries
82. Leena Menghaney, Patent Dispute: Delhi High Court Gives a Boost to Access to Affordable
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depend on generics from India. MSF buys more than twenty-five per cent of
the drugs for malaria, TB, and antibiotics from India. Moreover, approximately
fifty per cent of essential medicines that UNICEF distributes in developing
countries come from India, “while 75-80% of medicines distributed by
International Dispensary Association are made in India.”83 India has become
the dispensary for the poor of the world. Since the 1970s, India has become a
drug producer for the developing world, revolutionizing the treatment of
diseases like AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria with low-cost generics. “It now
makes one-fifth of the world’s generics.”84 Indeed, it is because of competition
from Indian generics that the cost of HIV/AIDS treatment has come down from
$10,000-$15,000 to $150 per patient per year, since the 1990s.85 This is a result
of tremendous growth of pharmaceutical industry in India since 1960s,
encouraged by government policies, the enterprising nature of postindependence born Indians,86 and the Patent Act 1970. This Act changed in
2005, and TRIPS flexibilities were introduced. The reason this merits our
attention is because such policy changes have had, and will have, far reaching
consequences in India’s pharmaceutical industry, which is the world’s third
largest by volume87 and is poised to grow even further. In addition, it will also
have a bearing on India’s access to medicine situation. India also has the largest
population of people who are living without any adequate access to basic
medicine. 65% of the Indian population lives below the access to medicine
line.88 The government expenditure on health is only 17.9% while private
expenditure is 82.1% reports the National Health Accounts of India and this
happens when drugs accounts for about 70% of the total expenditure on health.
Lack of purchasing power is one of the main reasons behind poor access to

Medicines, 7 INDIAN J. MED. ETHICS 97, 100 n.2 (2010).
83. Priyanka Golikeri, EU Firm on Strong IP Provisions in Free Trade, DAILY NEWS AND
ANALYSIS, 8 June 2010.
84. Erika Kinetz, Europe Trade Deal Could Hit Indian Generic Drugs, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
April 26, 2010.
85. Latha Jishnu, Vicious Sting in the Tail of FTAs, BUSINESS STANDARD (June 24, 2009),
http://www.business-standard.com/article/opinion/latha-jishnu-vicious-sting-in-the-tail-of-ftas-10906
2400080_1.html.
86. See, e.g., AMLANJYOTI GOSWAMI, NAMITA DALMIA, & MEGHA PRADHAN,
ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN INDIA (2008) (discusses in detail a primary survey conducted on Indian
entrepreneurial aspects); R. Gopalakrishnan, “Prosperity Beyond Our Cities by Spreading Enterprise,”
AD Shroff Memorial Lecture, October 17, 2007; see also TARUN KHANNA, BILLIONS OF
ENTREPRENEURS: HOW CHINA AND INDIA ARE RESHAPING THEIR FUTURE AND YOURS (2007);
PAVAN VERMA, BEING INDIAN (2005).
87. M.V. Ramsurya, Pharma, Engineering to Topple IT as Big Paymaster, ECONOMIC TIMES,
June 8, 2010.
88. Andrew Creese, Nadine Gasman & Mamadou Mariko, The World Medicines Situation
(2004), http://www.ops.org.bo/textocompleto/ime23901.pdf.
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essential medicines in India.
During almost the same time that India moved towards new patent laws–
Canada made noticeable efforts too. It is the only country in the world to
employ the August 30 decision to export essential medicines to countries that
do not have capacities to manufacture them. Canada has been able to do it
successfully (although we will later see, it has its own implementation fallacies)
and stands out in patiently carrying out the procedures in a multilateral level.
Indian and Canadian experiences are very few of those that encapsulate
implementation of TRIPS’ flexibilities for compulsory licensing89 and a
comparative analysis will throw light on what these countries have to learn from
each other and indeed, what other nations may need to follow from there.
That said, the authors recognize the relatively differential economic and
social locations of the two countries, and strongly note that our analysis is
insulated from these natural concerns. Even though the economies of the two
countries are markedly different from each other, the issue of access to
medicines, which this article primarily concerns with, is viewed from supply
side economy. Our analytical framework dissects institutions at the level of
manufacturing and patenting. As long as the countries have manufacturing
abilities, different economic growth rates and relevant indicators do not call for
the need of employing GDP deflator or purchasing power parity parameters.
These instruments would be crucial if we are to study the market demand
institutions. The existence of competitive manufacturing ability, coupled with
similar-spirited legal framework that governs supply side makes the
comparative case immune to divergent economies and societies. Hence, even
though Canada and India are dissimilar in multiple respects, one of the few
converging legal frameworks exists in the case of pharmaceutical industry–
which is something we intend to explore.
A. Access to Medicine Regime in Canada
Canada introduced the Patent Act in 1923, and developed aggressive policy
on compulsory licenses on pharmaceutical products.90 The only problem was
the requirement to manufacture key ingredients in Canada. Since the Canadian
market was strong, producers did not have incentives to produce generic drugs
making use of the compulsory licensing using expensive labour and the
89. See Yugank Goyal, Economic and Procedural Constraints of Compulsory Licenses for
Medicines, in COMPULSORY LICENSING─PRACTICAL EXPERIENCES AND WAYS FORWARD (Reto
Hilty & Kung-Chung Liu eds., (forthcoming 2014) (For detailed analysis of compulsory licenses
granted since Doha); see also Reed Beall & Randall Kuhn, Trends in Compulsory Licensing of
Pharmaceuticals Since the Doha Declaration: A Database Analysis, 9 PLOS MED. 1 (2012).
90. See Paris Convention, supra note 25 at art. 5A (perhaps the only restriction was the
prescribed minimum period of time before a compulsory license could be applied for).
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technology of Canada.91 This became a crisis92, and in 1969, Canadian
Parliament amended the Act to allow for import of active ingredient and
medicines. This reform had drastic results. In the two decades following the
1969 Amendment, 1030 applications were filed for compulsory licenses and
613 licenses were granted as against forty-nine applications received (of which
twenty-two patents granted) since 1923 until 1969.93
In late the 1980s, pressurized from diplomatic corners and North American
Free Trade Agreement, Canada was, for lack of a better term, forced to amend
its compulsory licensing policies.94 In 1993, Canada abolished the compulsory
license regime. Canada however, designed new ways of promoting generics,
using different ‘term of protection,’ ‘early working patents,’ and ‘stockpiling
options.’ These created a lot of stir amongst U.S. and E.U. pharmaceutical
lobbies and they dragged Canada to World Trade Organisation (WTO) dispute
resolution. It appears that Canada was so dissuaded by external pressures trying
to control its Patent Act that as soon as the 30 August 2003 WTO decision on
the eve of Cancun Ministerial Conference (after Doha Development Round)
was declared, in less than a month, Canada announced its intention to
implement the same. Canada was the first country to employ compulsory
licensing using Decision of 30 August for importing an HIV drug to Rwanda.
B. Pharmaceutical Patents in India
In India, pharmaceutical patents were first introduced by the British, during
colonial rule, when they passed first patent law in 1856, just before formal
beginning of British Raj.95 By 1970, India had realized that it has been hit by
the influence of foreign firms (which controlled 70% of the Indian market)96,

91. See Donald McFetridge, Intellectual Property, Technology Diffusion, and Growth in
Canadian Economy, in COMPETITION POLICY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN KNOWLEDGE BASED
ECONOMY 65 (Robert Anderson & Nancy Gallini eds., 1998).
92. The drug prices in Canada reached amongst the highest in the world, and Canadian
provinces began to nationalize their medical services and pay for pharmaceuticals to cushion people’s
burden. See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE OTTAWA RESTRICTIVE TRADES AND PRACTICES COMMISSION,
REPORT CONCERNING THE MANUFACTURE, DISTRIBUTION AND SALE OF DRUGS (1963); see also
Canada (1966), House of Commons, Special Committee on Drug Costs and Prices: Report of the
Standing Committee on Drugs Costs and Prices, Ottawa: Queen’s Printer.
93. See HARRY C. EASTMAN, THE REPORT OF COMMISSION OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY
ON THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY (1985).
94. For political details about the amendment, see Joel Lexchin, Globalisation, Trade Deals
and Drugs: Heads, the Industry Wins; Tails, Canada Loses, 2 CAN. CENTRE POL’Y ALTERNATIVES
(2001).
95. See P. NARAYANAN, PATENT LAW 5–6 (4th ed. 2006).
96. P.K. Ramachandran and B.V. Rangarao, The Pharmaceutical Industry in India, 7 ECON. &
POL. WKLY. M-27 (1972).
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and high drug prices.97 India therefore, passed a law on patents that prohibited
product patent on medicines. The Indian Patents Act of 1970 acted as the main
thrust to India’s pharmaceutical industry.98 This led to a steep fall in the number
of patents granted.99 Although the law permitted process patents on
medicines100, it was rarely sought and had limited scope.101 This therefore, gave
rise to a number of local pharmaceutical firms increasing their share of the
market.102 Indian pharmaceutical firms became larger and more sophisticated.
They employed reverse engineering methods to develop new processes for the
drugs. Over the next three decades, the Indian pharmaceutical industry became
extremely competitive and diverse103 and by the 1990s, India started producing
the most inexpensive medicines in the world.104
In 1995, WTO introduced TRIPS. TRIPS set up minimum standards of IP
regulation105 specifying enforcement mechanisms, dispute resolution features,
and remedies. India opposed TRIPS initially,106 but finally acceded to the
Agreement, since staying out of WTO framework was a difficult choice.
However, India bought time until 2005 to comply with TRIPS. By this time,
97. S. REP. NO. 87-448, at 43–44 (1961) (Which showed India with the highest prices of the
seventeen countries surveyed, which included the United States); see Daniel D. Adams and William
E. Nelson, The Drug Amendments of 1962, 38 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1082 (1963) (For report and other
aspects of the sub-committee).
98. Jean Lanjouw, The Introduction of Pharmaceutical Product Patents in India: Heartless
Exploitation of Poor and Suffering 3–4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6366,
1998).
99. Id.at 4.
100. See The Patents Act, 1970, No. 39, § 53(1) Acts of Parliament (2013) available at
http://ipindia.nic.in/ipr/patent/patent_Act_1970_28012013_book.pdf. For example, such patents only
lasted for the shorter of five years from the date of grant or seven years from the date the patent was
filed.
101. H. Ashok Chandra Prasad & Shripad Bhat, Strengthening India’s Patent System:
Implications for Pharmaceutical Sector, 28 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 1037, 1057 (1993).
102. This was accompanied by other regulatory and policy measures that the government took
to encourage building local markets against foreign firms. See id.
103. See SUDIP CHAUDHURI, THE WTO AND INDIA’S PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: PATENT
PROTECTION, TRIPS AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2005) (For an overview of how pharmaceutical
industry developed after patent law was enacted); Aradhna Aggarwal, Strategic Approach to
Strengthening the International Competitiveness in Knowledge Based Industries: The Indian
Pharmaceutical Industry, RIS, Discussion Paper No. 80 (2004) http://ris.org.in/images/RIS_images/
pdf/Dp80_pap.pdf.
104. See CHAUDHURI, supra note 103, at 46–58.
105. TRIPS contains requirements that nations’ laws must meet for copyright rights, including
the rights of performers, producers of sound recordings and broadcasting organizations; geographical
indications, including appellations of origin; industrial designs; integrated circuit layoutdesigns; patents; monopolies for the developers of new plant varieties; trademarks; trade dress; and
undisclosed or confidential information. See id. See also Aggarwal, supra note 103.
106. George K. Foster, Opposing Forces in a Revolution in International Patent Protection:
The U.S. and India in the Uruguay Round and its Aftermath 3 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 283.
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Doha Development Agenda had been carved out as well. In 2005, India
adopted TRIPS, and thereby institutionalized product patent regime in the
pharmaceutical sector, supplanting the earlier process patent approach in
pharmaceutical industry in the Patents Act 2005.
The distinction between product and process patents is important to be
emphasized. India had only process patents since 1970. In pharmaceutical
industry, a process patent inherently makes it easier for generic manufacturers
to adopt a different process and produce the same product by reverse
engineering. Since the marginal cost of making a drug is negligible, process
patents enables generic manufacturers to manufacture a drug at a substantially
cheap prices and consequently, market it at cheap price. This way, from patent
policy’s perspective, access to medicines was not a concern107–meaning Patent
Act 1970 has produced a favoured system for access to medicine in India.108
Therefore, India never needed compulsory license. In other words, even if
compulsory licensing was allowed, there were other less expensive means to
produce generic drugs, so it would have been useless legislation.
In 2005, India adopted TRIPS and consequently, product patents, thereby
strengthening the IPR regime. Since TRIPS in its pristine form was highly
unfavourable to developing countries’ concerns regarding access, the
flexibilities implanted in TRIPS by Doha Declaration, were also quickly
adopted by India. One of the flexibilities was compulsory licensing.
V. LOCATING CANADA AND INDIA IN THE MODEL
Our hypothesis emerging out of the above discussion is that while Canada
exhibits a strong IPR regime, India does not. Canada is characterized by (a)
product patents, (b) TRIPS-compliant laws, (c) R&D investments in
107. See Biswajit Dhar & Niranjan Rao, Transfer of Technology for Successful Integration into
the Global Economy: A Case Study of the Pharmaceutical Industry in India, UNCTAD/UNDP
Programme on Globalisation, Liberalisation and Sustainable Development, New Delhi U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/ITE/IPC/Misc.22 (For the role of patents in the evolution of the Indian pharmaceutical
industry); see also, CHAUDHURI, supra note 103.
108. Access to medicines has been a primary concern from the perspectives of affordability
though, and largely so. India is overburdened by communicable and infectious diseases alongside an
emerging epidemic of non-communicable diseases. But public health spending constitutes around
0.9% of Gross Domestic Product. Government expenditure of health in India is 17.9% of the total
health expenditure and remaining 82.1% is private in nature. See Central Bureau of Health Intelligence,
National Health Profile 2005, CENTRAL BUREAU OF HEALTH INTELLIGENCE, NATIONAL HEALTH
PROFILE 77–79 (2005); see also MINISTRY OF HEALTH AND FAMILY WELFARE, NATIONAL HEALTH
ACCOUNTS OF INDIA 2001—2002 (2005) (For the details of health financing in India). The World
Health Organisation’s World Medicine Situation Report based 1999 data state that out of (the then)
998 million people in India, only 17% has the access to medicine. For an overview, see K. M.
Gopakumar, Product Patents and Access to Medicines in India: Critical Review of Implementation of
TRIPS Patent Regime, 3 L. & DEV. REV. 325 (2010).
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pharmaceuticals, and (d) strict enforcement laws in place. Upon carefully
viewing the de facto patterns of patent rights intensity there, there is little doubt
that Canada possesses very high strength in IPR regimes. India on the other
hand, has only recently amended its weak patent laws to make itself TRIPScompliant and create a framework for product patents. Even after the de jure
change, the situation in India remains bleak as far as strength of IP rights are
concerned. De facto piracy and IP infringement is very high in India, and even
after amending the patent laws India has a long way to go before it can remotely
be called as a country driven by strong IP rights.
We showed that strong property regimes favour voluntary licensing, while
weak regimes attract compulsory licensing. This is because negotiations fail in
case of weak property rights, and so government has to intervene and create a
liability rule, in the form of compulsory licensing. In strong property rights
regimes, voluntary licensing can work and compulsory licensing is suitable for
weak property rights regime only. This means, Canada is suited for a strong
property rights framework and India for a liability approach. In other words,
compulsory licensing creates a reverse spiral and pulls strong property rights
towards transformation into weak property rights structure. Strong IP laws are
viewed to make information readily available, crystallizing boundaries and
ensuring certainty of rules and institutions. In such a situation, players are free
to transact with each other, negotiate, renegotiate, and buy/sell licenses. This
system is supposed to work through a property rights framework. Just when a
liability rule approach is impregnated into the system, it develops cracks to
weaken the existing property rights structure and strong IP framework.
A. Compulsory Licensing and its Impact on Strength of IP Regime
Compulsory licensing is an old idea, first adopted by the 1883 Paris
Convention, and fossilized into the pharmaceutical debate with respect to
access to medicines.109 For a variety of reasons, it has been noted as a
‘destructive’110 approach. This is largely due to its potential to erode
exclusivity of right and therefore disrupt an expected future profit from a
patented medicine,111 which demands heavy investment in the first place.112 It
109. See Chien, supra note 26.
110. We borrow this phrase from Jamie Feldman, Compulsory Licenses: The Dangers Behind
the Current Practice, 8 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 137, 139 (2009).
111. Janna Greve, Healthcare in Developing Countries and the Role of Business: A Global
Governance Framework to Enhance the Accountability of Pharmaceutical Companies, 8 CORP.
GOVERNANCE: INT’L J. OF BUS. IN SOC’Y 490 (2008).
112. According to one estimate made three years ago, on an average, pharmaceutical industries
spend upto $288 billion on R&D. See, e.g., Marc-André Gagnon & Joel Lexchin, The Cost of Pushing
Pills: A New Estimate of Pharmaceutical Promotion Expenditures in the United States, 5 PLOS MED.
29, 30 (2008), http://medicine.plosjournals.org/archive/1549-1676/5/1/pdf/10.1371_journal.pmed.
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is important to understand that most pharmaceutical research does not conclude
in a patented medicine but instead renders many unsuccessful results. Hence
these companies must secure earnings that cover both R&D costs as well as
cost of such futile research.113 Any decrease in such risky research will hurt
medical innovation. Compulsory licensing dilutes these incentives, and
Compulsory licensing acts as
therefore can be counterproductive.114
expropriation of IP and therefore sends a chilling effect to attractiveness of
undertaking risky research on diseases that affect the developing world.
Yet, empirically, the correlation between investments in R&D and patent
protection is not very convincing. Few studies have shown that perhaps the
only industry, in which there exists a positive correlation between patent
protection and investments in R&D, is that of pharmaceutical industry.115 Fisch
has tried to establish that compulsory licensing reduces investments into
research116 by comparing innovation activities in Canada and the United States
in a period when the former was going through intense programme of
compulsory licensing, and when Canada had much lower investment on
research during this period. Yet, as Eastman Commission reveals, if compared
to other small, developed countries, compulsory licensing did not significantly
erode the innovation in Canada.117 This was largely because Canada’s market
was rather insignificant to the worldwide market for pharmaceuticals.118 In a
classic study of 700 companies (various industries, including pharmaceutical),
forty-two of which were subject to compulsory licensing, Scherer notes that
these forty-two companies actually spent more on R&D.119 A very interesting
study by Moser and Voena uses an exogenous event of compulsory licensing
after World War I, under the ‘Trading With the Enemy Act’ to examine the
0050001-S.pdf.
113. Greve, supra note 111.
114. One of the good arguments that disfavour overuse of compulsory licenses is Kevin
Outterson, Fair Followers: Expanding Access to Generic Pharmaceuticals for Low-income
Populations,
7
(2008),
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/prizefund/files/outtersonaccess-togenerics.pdf.
115. See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK (2008).
116. Alan M. Fisch, Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceutical Patents: An Unreasonable
Solution to an Unreasonable Problem, 34 JURIMETRICS J. 295, 313 (1994).
117. Donald G. McFetridge, Intellectual Property, Technology Diffusion, and Growth in the
Canadian Economy, in COMPETITION POLICY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN
THE KNOWLEDGE BASED ECONOMY 65 (Robert D. Anderson & Nancy T. Gallini eds., 1998).
118. Id. McFetridge reports that with the exception of Merck, 1994 Canadian R&D
expenditures as a percentage of worldwide expenditures were less than 2%; e.g. 1.3% for Glaxo, 1.0%
for Hoffman LaRoche, 0.7% for Pfizer, 1.2% for Sandoz, 1.4% for Ciba, 1.7% for Eli Lilly, and 6.1%
for Merck. Id. at 84, n.24.
119. FREDERIC M. SCHERER, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF COMPULSORY PATENT LICENSING
67–75 (New York University Monograph Series in Finance and Economics, 1977).
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effect of compulsory licensing on domestic innovation.120 Analyzing around
130,000 chemical inventions, Moser and Voena conclude compulsory licensing
increased innovation by about 20%.121 There is, therefore, hardly any
conclusive correlation that compulsory licensing hurts incentives to innovation.
However, the fact that pharmaceutical companies will have weakened
incentives to invest in drugs for those diseases that are prevalent in countries
having strong compulsory licensing, cannot be ignored. Indeed, firms often
invest in life-style drugs rather than life saving drugs like for malaria, since the
latter breaks into countries that have little affordability, and therefore higher
instances of compulsory licensing.122 The impression of the strength of the IP
regime in a country could therefore be measured by how frequent and readily
available compulsory licenses are in that country. The costs of compulsory
licensing will be high in countries that have weak IPR, because these very
countries will also have weak IPR regimes. In a way, this gives rise to a vicious
cycle.
India presents a case of weak IP rights. In India, there was no product patent
for a long time since 1970. This developed Indian pharmaceutical company
into an imitating giant–thereby obviating any need of licensing structure.
However, since the mid-1990s, when India decided to be a part of TRIPS, the
strategy started shifting. One of the most notable features was increasing thrust
in R&D.123 India had no inclination to join TRIPS and had vociferously argued
against joining the treaty,124 but given that negotiations were being done from
the WTO, she finally acceded. However, India was given until 2005 to comply
with TRIPS. This transition period had immense impact on the mindset of the
pharmaceutical industry and that of policy makers in India.125 TRIPS propelled
the Indian pharmaceutical industry to identify existing markets outside India
and started looking to export, thereby intensifying their R&D efforts. It has
become one of the largest suppliers of pharmaceutical formulations in the world
by volume126 and leading Indian pharmaceutical firms earn more of their
120. Petra Moser & Alessandra Voena, Compulsory Licensing: Evidence from the Trading with
the Enemy Act, 102 AM. ECON. REV. 396 (2012).
121. Id.at 396.
122. Joseph Stiglitz, Trade Agreements and Health in Developing Countries, 373 LANCET 363,
364 (2009).
123. Mainak Mazumdar & Meenakshi Rajeev, Comparing Efficiency of Indian Pharmaceutical
Firms, 57 INDIAN ECON. J. 60, 61 (2010).
124. Foster, supra note 106.
125. For example, India took other steps towards complying with TRIPS requirements in 2002,
when it extended a twenty-year term to all patents, reversed the burden of proof in process infringement
cases, and introduced for the first time a definition of “inventive step.” The Patents Act, 1970, No. 39,
§§ 2(ja), 53, 104(a) Acts of Parliament, 2013.
126. See, e.g., Shubham Chaudhuri, Pinelopi K. Goldberg, & Panle Jia, Estimating the Effects
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revenue through exports than through domestic market.127 Empowered,
currently domestic companies control 80% of the domestic market when in
1970 the share of Indian companies was only 20%.128 The exports of drugs and
pharmaceuticals by the Indian pharmaceutical industry are around 5.3 billion
dollars.129 Indian players regard globalization and IP as one of the strongest
driving forces for this change.
But even then, many of the biggest generic pharmaceutical product firms
opened in India and they exported drugs to countries that have no patent
protection, or those for which patents have expired. Today, India’s
pharmaceutical industry is not hinged on R&D, unlike many developed
countries. Although high barriers to entry in developed world market
discouraged Indian pharmaceutical players to enter in that market, from the
mid-1990s, Indian companies started making some serious efforts and slowly
gained expertise in producing generic drugs in compliance with highly
regulated pharmaceutical industry abroad. Yet, the industry remained under
the umbrella of weak patent rights.130 This only builds a case for compulsory
licensing to be implemented in India.
B. Procedural Problems with Compulsory Licensing in Canada and India
Canada’s Access to Medicines Regime (CAMR) was the first domestic
statute to implement WTO’s 30 August decision in the world.131 CAMR
provides a system for pharmaceutical manufacturers to export generic drugs to
least developed countries (LDCs) and developing nations through compulsory
licensing. However, shortcomings of compulsory licensing are visible once we
dissect the chronology of first (and only) case of compulsory licensing–export
of Apo TriAvir, an antiviral cocktail medication used for treatment of
HIV/AIDS, by Apotex (a Canadian generic pharmaceutical manufacturer) to
Rwanda.

of Global Patent Protection in Pharmaceuticals: A Case Study of Quinolones in India, 96 AM. ECON.
REV. 1477, 1479 (2006).
127. For example, more than 80 percent of the sales of the leading firm Ranbaxy occur outside
of India. Ranbaxy Labs. Ltd., Key Markets Review, ANN. REP., 2007, at 12–14
http://www.ranbaxy.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/ar2007.pdf.
128. See Gopakumar, supra note 108, at 329; see also Reji K. Joseph, India’s Trade in Drugs
and Pharmaceuticals: Emerging Trends, Opportunities and Challenges, RIS, Discussion Paper
No.159 (2009).
129. See Joseph, supra note 128.
130. Aaron Smith, India’s Elephant in the Room: Weak Patent Laws, CNN MONEY (May 4,
2007), http://money.cnn.com/2007/05/04/news/companies/india_biotech/; see also Economic and
Political Weekly, A Confusing Patent Law for India, 40 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 1576, 1576 (2005).
131. See Richard Elliot, Pledges and Pitfalls: Canada’s Access to Compulsory Licensing of
Pharmaceutical for Export, 1 INT’L J. INTELL. PROP. MGMT. 94 (2006).
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The same year when Canada amended its patent laws to incorporate WTO’s
August 30 decision to give birth to CAMR, Apotex committed to and began
developing fixed dose combination of the HIV/AIDS antiviral drugs132, which
were still under patent protection.133 The cost differential was substantial.134
Apotex then had to amend the CAMR to include “combination” drugs in its
scope. This approval came from all sources in August 2006. Then started the
process of voluntary negotiations with patent holders (this is an essential
criteria whereby all possibilities of voluntary negotiations have to be exhausted
before applying for compulsory licensing) to buy the license. Until September
2007, these negotiations had not been concluded.135 Meanwhile in July 2007,
the Rwandan government had notified WTO of its plan to import the drug from
Canada. This notification from Canada went to WTO in October 2007. Apotex
won the tender in Rwanda by May 2008, and the first package was shipped to
Rwanda in September 2008. It took more than one year for the shipment to
reach the actual beneficiaries. Overall, it took five years for one compulsory
license structure to be effectively invoked and employed using the 30 August
2003 WTO Decision—no wonder there have been none ever since.136
In India, TRIPS/Doha style compulsory licenses have been incorporated in
the amended Patents Act of 2005.137 Under Section 84, any person can make
an application for a grant of compulsory license for a patent after three years
from date of grant of the patent.138 Section 92A enables export of
pharmaceutical products to any country having insufficient or no
manufacturing capacity in pharmaceutical sector. Note that Canada does not
have a counterpart provision of Section 84, but only 92A.

132. Holger Hestermeyer, Canadian-made Drugs for Rwanda: The First Application of WTO
Waiver on Patents and Medicines, 11 ASIL INSIGHT (Dec. 10, 2007), http://www.asil.org/insights/
volume/11/issue/28/canadian-made-drugs-rwanda-first-application-wto-waiver-patents-and.
133. The patents were held by Glaxo-SmithKline, and Shire and Boehringer Ingelheim. See id.
134. Apo TrivAvir costed forty cents per pill, while patented medicine was priced at twenty
dollars. See Christina Cotter, The Implications of Rwanda’s Paragraph 6 Agreement with Canada for
Other Developing Countries, 5 CHINA INT’L L. REV. 177, 185 (2008).
135. As we will see later, negotiations involving voluntary negotiations cannot remain
unprejudiced if scope for compulsory licensing remains. See id.
136. See George Tsai, Canada’s Access to Medicines Regime: Lessons for Compulsory
Licensing Schemes under the WTO Doha Declaration, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 1063, 1079 (2009) (for a
brief chronology of events).
137. The Patents Act, 1970, No. 39, Acts of Parliament, 2013 (dedicated Chapter XVI to the
“Working of Patents, Compulsory Licenses and Revocation” and clarifies the ambit of compulsory
licensing).
138. Id. at §84 (The grounds that may be vouched to apply for the same include: “(a) that the
reasonable requirements of the public with respect to the patented invention have not been satisfied,
or (b) that the patented invention is not available to the public at a reasonably affordable price, or (c)
that the patented invention is not worked in the territory of India.”).
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India’s first ever–and only one as yet–compulsory license application was
made by Natco Pharma to allow it to manufacture Roche’s patented drug
Erlonitib (its trade name is Tarceva) for export to Nepal.139 This case was then
digressed to another relevant though procedural matter, when Natco Pharma
filed an interlocutory petition asserting that patentees be disallowed to
participate in compulsory license hearings that takes place between the Patent
Office and Natco.140 The petition was dismissed. However, in March 2012,
the Controller of Patents granted the first ever compulsory license in India to
Natco.141
Even the process of granting the first ever compulsory license was not free
of its own complexity.142 This labyrinth of meandering structure of compulsory
license has shown that it is not an easy medicine to administer.143 Yet, the costs
of the procedure are worth the efforts in countries where IP regime is weak. It
is in these countries that inter-firm bargaining may not help nations achieve
access to medicines, if left unto themselves. Government needs to step in,
invest in procedural costs and administrative delays, and ensure that people
have access to life saving drugs.
C. Voluntary Licensing Works Alone but Cannot Co-Exist with Compulsory
Licensing
Voluntary licensing works in low market transaction cost, which in turn
creates fertile breeding ground for strong IP laws and their sustenance. Indeed,
voluntary licensing has been working in most parts of the world where IP laws
139. Following this, another application was also filed by Natco to obtain a license for Pfizer’s
Sutent, also an anti-cancer drug. See Peter Ollier, India Holds Drugs Hearings, 182 MANAGING
INTELL. PROP. 62 (2008).
140. The issue in interlocutory petition was of audi alteram partem (hear the other side). This
was purely a procedural issue from standpoint of this paper, hence we are not discussing it at all. For
those interested, see Kumar, supra note 55.
141. Natco Pharma Limited v. Bayer Corporation, Compulsory Licence Application No
1/2011. See J. J. Nedumpara & P. Misra, NATCO v. BAYER: Indian Patent Authority Grants Its First
Ever Compulsory License on Pharmaceutical Products, 7 GLOBAL TRADE & CUSTOMS J. 326 (2012);
Shamnad Basheer, India’s first compulsory license: Patents v. public health, IP OSGOODE (2012),
available at http://www.iposgoode.ca/2012/04/india%E2%80%99s-first-compulsory-license-patentsvs-public-health/.
142. For
details
into
the
entire
application
process
and
case,
see
http://spicyip.com/2012/03/breaking-news-indias-first-compulsory.html and http://spicyip.com/2011/
09/anatomy-of-natcos-compulsory-license.html and relevant hyperlinks therein.
143. By way of information, recently in January this year, Natco Pharma has sought a voluntary
license from Pfizer to manufacture and sell the latter’s drug Maraviroc (sold as Celsentri) for HIV
positive patients. This drug is expensive and Natco’s claim is to manufacture the same drug at very
cheap prices. It is expected that Pfizer is going to deny the license (it has six months to reply), owing
to high cost in R&D that went behind the drug. Consequently, we may expect a legal battle again. See
Khomba Singh, Natco Seeks Pfizer Nod for Drug Clone, ECON. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2011.
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are strong. Oseltamivir, a drug marketed under the brand name Tamiflu, was
developed to fight influenza and has been instrumental in treating millions of
patients of bird flu, swine flu, and the like.144 This drug is sold by Roche, but
it was developed by Gilead Sciences (which still holds the patent) and licensed
to Roche. In fact, Gilead has twelve drugs patented under its name, and eight
of them have been licensed to other players at a fee decided mutually between
the two parties.145 Roche sub-licensed the Tamiflu drug to Hetero Drugs in
India to speed up availability.146 Last year, Santarus bought the license to make
a diabetes drug marketed under the name of Cycloset tablet, from S2
Therapeutics and VeroScience, at five million dollars.147 Structure for such
voluntary licensing is very straightforward and works like any other license
negotiation process, entirely voluntary. In fact, it is fairly common to observe
laboratories discovering the drug, and then licensing it to other manufacturers
who can better market them. Imagine a singer, who sings and licenses the songs
to record company. If property rights are strong, and (consequently) transaction
costs are low, such bargains can emerge. We must recognize that for companies
there is no difference between drugs and audio CDs, no matter how much of
difference it is for the consumers. And any activity to tame inherent incentive
game will only hurt the consumers more. This is a strong statement, but the
sooner we realize its poignant truth, the better we can structure the system.
Our contention is that when compulsory licensing exists in the market, it
erodes all possibilities of a voluntary licensing between manufacturer and
generic manufacturer to exist. If the licensee knows that after certain a period
of time, she will get a compulsory license, at a fixed known rate of royalty, she
will never accept a license higher than that rate. On the other side of the table,
the licensor will never reach any figure lower than that fixed rate. Hence, the
bargain will never reach, and if it reaches, it will always arrive at the rate fixed
by government for license fee. India and Canada are good examples. Royalty
of both countries is fixed (Canada used a more sophisticated method to
calculate it, and India uses crude averages). Hence, both in Apotex (Canada)
and Natco’s cases (India), the parties could never have voluntarily contracted
in the first place.148
144. See Weekly Virological Update on 05 August 2010, WHO (2010), http://www.who.int/csr/
disease/swineflu/laboratory06_08_2010/en.
145. Gilead, ANN. REP., 20 (2009), http://www.allejaarverslagen.nl/reports/508_2009.pdf.
146. Roche Grants Tamiflu Sub-license to India’s Hetero Drugs to Make Flu Medicines for
India and Developing Countries, MED. NEWS TODAY (Dec. 23, 2005, 5:00 PM PST) available at
http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/35342.php.
147. Update 1-Santarus Buys License to Make Diabetes Drug for $5 mln, REUTERS, Sep. 8,
2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSSGE6870KN20100908.
148. Canada and India are not alone. Efavirenz (commercially sold as Storcrin) was the highest
used antiretroviral drug in Brazil. Brazil wanted to pursue a compulsory licensing approach to the
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It would be a highly optimistic picture if we propose that voluntary
licensing will always succeed in the absence of compulsory licensing. This is
because research in patent activities of a drug can be highly uncertain and it is
hard to predict inventions and value them ex ante.149 Such uncertainty in the
discovery process (of both the drug and its value) is bound to create divergence
in both parties’ expectations and may stall the negotiation process.150 Such
uncertainty also gives rise to strategic behavior during the contracting
process.151 Therefore, voluntary licensing is not expected to always work.
However, there is no reason to believe (infact more so on the contrary) that
compulsory licensing is better suited.
In addition, it is imperative to note that (a) courts may not effectively
identify hold-up situations, justifying liability rules, (b) even if courts can
identify the true scenarios, they are ill-suited to develop a liability rule
framework.152 The would-be purchasers of property right would invariably
prefer liability rules and use them as an opportunity for government rentseeking. Parties see courts as administrative agencies overseeing liability rules
as providing ‘cheap option’ which means a better deal than they could obtain
in a marketplace arrangement. As noted long ago, by F.M. Sherer, “All in all,
the substantial amount of evidence now available suggests that compulsory
patent licensing, judiciously confined to cases in which patent-based monopoly
power has been abused . . . would have little or no adverse impact on the rate
of technological progress.”153

drug. But this had prejudiced the negotiations on the side of Brazil. The voluntary negotiations
brought Merck (the manufacturer) to propose that it will ensure the technology transfer to
pharmaceutical manufacturer Farmanguinhos, in time. In addition, there will be two percent certain
price reduction and Farmanguinhos can purchase the drug supply and perform packaging and labeling
activities. But this negotiation did not reach any end, owing to the final recourse of CL available in
the hands of Brazilian government. And that’s exactly what happened. See Beatrice Sterner,
Compulsory Licensing of Efavirenz in Brazil, ACCESS TO PHARMACEUTICALS (Feb. 23, 2010)
available at http://www.accesstopharmaceuticals.org/case-studies-in-global-health/efavirenz-brazil/.
149. See Mark A. Lamey, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75
TEX. L. REV. 989; David J. Teece, Profiting from Technological Innovation: Implication for
Integration, Collaboration, Licensing and Public Policy, 15 RES. POL’Y 285 (1986).
150. See Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1982) (on dynamics of
bargain breakdown).
151. Ben Depoorter, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Patent Market Failure, 1 ERASMUS
L. REV. 59, 72 (2008).
152. See Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of the Cathedral: The Dominance of Property Rules,
106 YALE L.J. 2091 (1997).
153. FREDERIC M. SHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 456–57 (2d ed., 1980).
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VI. BY WAY OF AN EPILOGUE
Research on patents and intellectual property through the framework of
property-liability has achieved only some attention from IP scholars, in varying
dimensions.154 What we have tried to accomplish in this paper is to locate the
strength of IP regimes in the property-liability framework as proposed to classic
law and economics literature. We derived from Cathedral Paper that societies
must structure themselves on property rules when transaction costs are low and
liability rule when transaction costs are high. Voluntary licensing is an element
of property rule while compulsory licensing falls under the liability rule
approach. Hence, low transaction cost dictate voluntary licensing and high
transaction costs attract compulsory licensing. Empirical results show that
indeed strong IPR regimes favour voluntary licensing and weak regimes attract
compulsory licensing. This, when compared with previous results shows that
property rules are the best mode of reliance when we have strong IPR regimes
like Canada, and liability rules suit weak regimes like India.
This paper in no way makes an argument towards completeness of the
model, in explaining factors on which characteristics of compulsory licensing
depends. Indeed, a host of other factors determine a grant of compulsory
license, including royalty fee, duration, scope, legal framework, international
obligation, expected hit in FDI, relative bargaining position of the countries,
market potential, public funds towards innovation, and the like. This paper
attempts to create a discourse on one of the fundamental grounds of compulsory
licensing, which is, the strength of IPR regimes.
In addition, like any analytical framework, our methodology does come
with its inherent limitations. The model crucially rests on property-liability
framework elucidated in Cathedral Paper. That model, in turn pivots on
transaction cost economics. A lot of work has been done since then in
categorization, structural layering, and re-inventing the concepts of transaction
costs. The contextual application of transaction cost economics is therefore
very important. While our model does highlight the impact of such an analysis
on compulsory IP regimes of the countries, it would also largely depend on the
value of the transaction costs. These values are difficult to collate, and hence
most studies do not go deep into classifications of transaction costs, it does
merit the question of what happens if the transaction costs vary greatly in a
country from across regulations affecting the same industry. In addition,
154. A more general paper on such a framework is by Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules,
Coase and Intellectual Property, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2655 (1994); see also Jerome H. Reichman &
Tracy Lewis, Using Liability Rules to Stimulate Local Innovation in Developing Countries:
Application to Traditional Knowledge, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF
TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 337 (Keith E. Maskus &
Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2005).
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although extremely comprehensive, existence of only two categories–low and
high transaction costs–obscures subtle nuances in mid-level transaction costs.
Our model would suggest that for those transaction costs, only procedural
concerns in compulsory licensing will matter, but this cannot be conclusively
ascertained.
In addition, our approach seems to ignore intra-country differential
structures of the pharmaceutical industry. Firstly, note that compulsory
licensing does not make any sense in a country, which has no manufacturing
ability. Secondly, even with those countries that have sufficient manufacturing
capacity to warrant the use of liability approach, there may exist multiple
industry structures and heterogeneous manufacturing patterns in form of big
corporations and small and mid-sized enterprises and each one of these
different patterns demand different institutional processes for their efficiency.
However, we feel, the impact of such differential industry structure may not
alter the conclusions significantly.
In a society with strong IP rights, our critical approach to compulsory
licensing would seem to have developed an oversight to public interest
concerns. This view is by no means myopic, since our purpose has not been to
deliberately ignore this important issue. Let us address this possible concern at
two levels. Firstly, our stand is clear as far as medical emergency, epidemic or
drugs/diseases posing severe public health concerns and is sought to be dealt
with immediately–and that is to invoke compulsory license right away. Such
scenarios are untouched and safely insulated from the implications arising out
of our study. The research question that has been posed in the paper is
attempting to look at the institution of compulsory licensing in matters that are
business-as-usual. In other words, a general adoption of compulsory licensing
is discouraged, but not exceptional. Secondly, if the general discouragement
of compulsory licensing appears to come at the cost of public interest, then such
direct causal relationship needs to be rectified. The apportioned contribution
of present structure of compulsory licensing to achieve public interest goals is
highly overstated, something glaringly apparent in the two cases in Canada and
India. Compulsory licensing has been too much of a victim of procedures and
poor implementation. Hence, agency does not bear the entire blame or merit.
And these procedures are not easily rectifiable because they stem from the
nature of institution itself and its framework. Hence, compulsory licensing is
itself incapable of achieving public interest goals in the first place, at least not
to the levels expected. So we may need to find alternative solutions. Public
interest is important but amorphous policies that have no theoretical grounding
will do more harm than good.
We intend to propose two policy solutions that have increased merit as
compared to compulsory licensing for countries characterized by strong IP
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regimes. Elaborating these proposals is beyond the scope of the paper, but
given their success in separate institutional frameworks begs us to briefly
examine other alternatives. These two policy outlines are therefore merely
suggestive and require extensive study to test their efficacy. None of these
proposals can rectify informational problems vested in letting a third party
decide upon the license fee/price. However, they do not tamper with IP regimes
and let their structure stay strong.
a) One possible solution is competition law. Compulsory licensing
may not be justified because competition law can possibly benefit
at a relatively lesser cost compared to compulsory licensing that
imposes a huge cost on legal institutions. Using competition law,
similar to the model of Essential Facilities Doctrine (as is adopted
in EU) can help us do away with the perils of compulsory licensing,
yet achieve similar (intended) results. It is the abuse of dominant
position that patent accords to a company/product which must be
attacked.155 This idea is to view high prices as abuse of dominant
position, and let courts decide on appropriate prices, or let licenses
be given on that account. It is important to appreciate that even if
licenses come from competition law, they denote a structural and
functional divergence from compulsory licensing. Incentives to
innovate may not be diluted in the former case, because it has to be
proved in the court of law/competition commission that an abuse
had indeed happened. With India constituting competition law in
2005, and Canada’s Competition Act surfacing through
Competition Commission and Competition Bureau respectively, it
should be preferred in conjunction with strong IPR regimes.
b) The second possible alternative–a more specific and effective
strategy for India–would be to do what Canada has done. The
uniqueness lies in the federal government’s direct price control
regulation. This is done by an independent, quasi-judicial board,
called Patented Medicine Price Review Board (PMPRB).156
Whenever the Board feels that the price of a drug is excessive, it
intervenes and sets the optimum price. This is decided based on
several criteria. Particular attention is given to the median price for
this drug in seven comparable countries: France, Germany, Italy,
Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, and the US. If the drug contains a
155. For an impressive illustration, see John Temple Lang, The Application of the Essential
Facility Doctrine to Intellectual Property Rights under European Competition Law, in ANTITRUST,
PATENTS AND COPYRIGHT 56 (François Lévêque & Howard Shelanski eds., 2005).
156. Valérie Paris & Elizabeth Docteur, Pharmaceutical Pricing and Reimbursement Policies
in Canada, OECD HEALTH WORKING PAPERS 12-3 (2006) http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/21/40/
37868186.pdf.
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small improvement to already existing drugs, the board will first
compare its price with one of the drugs in the same therapeutic
class. This price comparison system is, in fact, very similar to those
used in other countries, such as in France, Spain, or Greece, when
determining what brand-name drug (patented or not, in this case)
can be listed on drug formularies.157 Another interesting thing is
that according to the Patent Act (sections 79ss), patented drug
prices cannot, in any case, exceed changes in the Consumer Price
Index. This has had a great effect on prices of the drugs. We
discussed above, that post 1987, towards a restricted compulsory
license regime, R&D investments have increased in Canada. It
must be mentioned that in the same time, patented drug prices
reduced considerably and became, on an average, below the
international median price.158 A chilling effect of such price review
board (although there is lack of enough empirical data), cannot be
denied, yet there is hardly any reason to believe that compulsory
licensing stifles access-to-medicine-policies any less.

157. See Melanie Bourassa Forcier & Jean-Frédéric Morin, Canadian Pharmaceutical Patent
Policy: International Constrains and Domestic Priorities, in AN EMERGING INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY PARADIGM: PERSPECTIVES FROM CANADA 81, 87–89 (Ysolde Gendreau ed., 2009).
158. See Paris & Docteur, supra note 156.

